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Tegman v. Accident & Medical Investigations, Inc.:
The Re-Modification of Modified Joint and
Several Liability by Judicial Fiat
Victor J. Torrest
That the innocent, though they may have some connexion or de-
pendency upon the guilty (which, perhaps, they themselves cannot
help), should not, upon that account, suffer or be punished for the
guilty, is one of the plainest and most obvious rules of justice.
-Adam Smith1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Tegman v. Accident
& Medical Investigations, Inc.2 is surprising given that the equities of the
situation strongly favored complete compensation to a fault-free plaintiff
with all defendants jointly and severally liable for all damages. Yet, in a
5-4 decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that negligent tortfea-
sors cannot be held jointly and severally liable with tortfeasors who have
f J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2006; B.A., English, University of San Fran-
cisco, 1997. The author dedicates this Note to Misty and Brendon, his wife and son, who have sacri-
ficed and endured the law school experience yet continued to give unwavering love and support. The
author also dedicates this Note to Carlos, Liway, and Leilani, his parents and sister, for their love
and support and contributing to the person he is today. The author would like to thank the partners
and associates at Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson, & Daheim, LLP, for their direc-
tion and assistance. Finally, the author wishes to recognize the editing support of the Seattle Univer-
sity Law Review, his law school friends for their understanding and encouragement, and Justice
Tom Chambers for his steady wisdom.
I. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759), available at http://www.
quotedb.com/quotes/3224 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
2. 150 Wash. 2d 102, 75 P.3d 497 (2003).
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committed intentional acts.3 Further, in determining liability, a court
must first segregate negligent from intentional tortfeasors, and then ap-
portion liability between all negligent parties.4 The majority decision
leaves the innocent plaintiff, Maria Tegman, to bear most of the financial
cost of her own injuries, and allows the defendant attorney, Lorinda No-
ble, to reduce her liability by blaming the criminal, G. Richard
McClellan, whose purposes she furthered. 5
The court's holding in Tegman strips certain plaintiffs of the chance
to be made whole, misguides judges and juries in their determination of
damages, evades ruling on issues it exposes, and should be reversed in its
infancy. If the court's opinion rests on the presumption that Washington
tort law is based on a pure comparative fault system, then the court
should also acknowledge that joint and several liability survives when
the plaintiff has no fault to which the defendant can compare. The ration-
ale of the Tegman opinion, however, is nothing short of mental gymnas-
tics-plaintiffs who are fault free are left to wonder whether they may be
left with the bill for injuries caused by others; defendants are celebrating
an unearned victory and new ally; attorneys on both sides must now con-
sider new and unprecedented legal strategies; judges face application of
this logistical nightmare with the possibility of absurd results; and the
public at large is forced to accept a ruling with results that the legislature
it elected did not contemplate or foresee.
Simply put, the majority got it wrong. In order to reduce the expo-
sure of some well-capitalized parties, the Washington Legislature created
a system relieving some tortfeasors of joint and several liability.6 How-
ever, the legislature also wanted fault-free plaintiffs to obtain a complete
recovery. 7 The legislature balanced these two goals in the Tort Reform
Act of 1986. But the Tegman majority, by giving too much weight to one
legislative goal, has eviscerated the other, and failed to mirror the legisla-
ture's complete intent in a context the legislature did not contemplate.
This Note explores the Tegman decision in the context of joint and
several liability between negligent and intentional actors within Wash-
ington State. Part II places Washington tort law into perspective, includ-
ing the doctrine of joint and several liability, both before and after the
Tort Reform Act of 1986. Part III discusses the Tegman decision, meth-
ods used in other jurisdictions for dealing with similar situations, and
3. Id. at 105, 75 P.3d at 497.
4. Id.
5. John Budlong, Tegman v. Accident and Medical Investigations, Inc., A Major Change in
Tort Law and Policy, WSTLA TRIAL NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, at 39-44.
6. See infra note 81.
7. Id.
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potential solutions to the problems posed by the Tegman holding. Fi-
nally, Part IV concludes and urges both the court to reconsider its ruling
in Tegman and the legislature to clarify its intent.
II. TORT LAW-A WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE
This Part lays the foundation necessary to critically analyze the
court's decision in Tegman. First, the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity will be introduced. Next, the principles of comparative negligence
and its contentious relationship with joint and several liability will be
examined as they struggle to co-exist. Finally, the issue of how Washing-
ton, through legislation and subsequent interpretation of the Tort Reform
Act of 1986, has enabled joint and several liability to survive within a
pure, yet modified, comparative negligence regime will be discussed.
A. The Common Law Roots of Joint and Several Liability
The theory of joint and several liability was a judicially created ve-
hicle for enforcing remedies for wrongs committed and, justified on pub-
lic policy grounds, it represented a deliberate allocation of risk.8 The ap-
plication of joint and several liability served dual purposes: (1) it acted as
a deterrent by making a defendant liable for all the consequences of neg-
ligence, even if the defendant's negligence was not the only cause of in-
jury, and (2) it encouraged settlement when settling defendants were pro-
tected by statute from an action for contribution. 9
The seminal case illustrating the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity is Summers v. Tice.'0 The California Supreme Court held that in a
case involving the tortious conduct of two or more actors, where the
harm to the plaintiff has been caused by only one of them, and it is un-
certain as to which caused the harm, the burden of proof is on the tor-
tious actors to prove their innocence.' While on a hunting trip, Summers
received injuries to his right eye and face after both of his two compan-
ions shot in his direction. 12 When the three men formed a triangle, each
of the defendants had an unobstructed view of Summers, and each of the
defendants was armed with an identical shotgun and shells, making it
impossible to determine which hunter had caused Summers's injuries.'
3
The court reasoned that the defendants should be left to resolve any ap-
8. See Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex. 1983); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 154
(2004).
9. In re Colo. Springs Air Crash, 867 F. Supp. 630, 634 (N.D. Il. 1994).
10. 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
II. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at2.
13. Id.
Seattle University Law Review
portionment problems among themselves because defendants are often in
a better position than a plaintiff to proffer evidence of the cause of plain-
tiffs injuries. 14 The court further noted that, under the circumstances,
each defendant should be held liable for the entire damage award, regard-
less of whether each defendant acted in concert or independently. 15 Thus,
despite Summers's inability to identify which hunter caused his injuries,
the court recognized that "where the matter of apportionment is incapa-
ble of proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his
right to redress. The wrongdoers should be left to work out between
themselves any apportionment."' ' 6
An understanding of the implications of the various types of liabil-
ity is necessary in order to appreciate the doctrine of joint and several
liability. Defendants are jointly liable when the liability is shared by two
or more parties' 7 who may or may not be joined in a single suit.' 8 Defen-
dants are severally liable when one's liability is separate and distinct
from the other's liability, and the plaintiff may bring a separate action
against one defendant without joining the other liable parties. 19 When
defendants are jointly and severally liable, the liability may be appor-
tioned either among two or more parties, or to only one or a few select
members of the liable group, at the plaintiffs discretion.20 The plaintiff is
not required to bring suit against all of the defendants, but can simply
proceed against the defendant who seems most exposed to liability or
most capable of responding to suit and satisfying a judgment.21
At common law, a plaintiff asserting a tort cause of action is enti-
tled to pursue any or all responsible defendants and thereafter collect any
part or all of the judgment against any one or more of the defendants
found to have contributed to the personal injury or property damage.22
Thus, each individual defendant is liable for the entire award of damages
regardless of his or her share of fault in comparison to the other defen-
dants. Multiple defendants acting in concert was the situation which gen-
erally gave rise to joint and several liability under common law. 23 In this
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 47:327-28 (5th
ed. 1984); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (7th ed. 2000).
18. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON & JOHN A. SILICIANO, THE TORTS
PROCESS 127 (6th ed. 2003).
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 296-97; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (7th ed. 2000).
20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 296-97; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (7th ed. 2000).
21. Cornelius J. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law
Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REv. 233, 236 (1987).
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 17, at 327-28.
23. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 127-28; Peck, supra note 21, at 235.
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scenario, all of the defendants would be responsible even if only one of
them caused the harm.24 This type of tort was normally intentional,
sometimes criminal in nature, and often involved a conspiracy.2 5
In modem times, multiple defendants have been classified based
upon different situations where joint and several liability may be im-
posed. These defendants have been labeled joint tortfeasors, concurrent
tortfeasors, and successive tortfeasors. Joint tortfeasors are those who
have acted in common or who have breached a joint duty. 26 In order for
tortfeasors to be classified as joint, the following elements must be met:
(1) a concert of action, (2) a unity of purpose or design, and (3) two or
more defendants working separately but to a common purpose, each act-
ing with the knowledge and consent of the others. 27 Concurrent tortfea-
sors act independently, but their separate acts cause a single indivisible
injury.28 Successive tortfeasors act independently, with respect to both
time and duty, and each causes separate and identifiable harms to the
plaintiff.2 9 However, an anomaly in the law exists when two independent
acts produce an indivisible harm. 30 Thus, successive tortfeasors whose
independent acts cause an indivisible harm may be held jointly and sev-
erally liable.
Under common law joint and several liability, multiple tortfeasors
who cause an indivisible injury are each liable for the entire harm.31 Al-
though the plaintiff could pursue recovery for the entire harm from any
one of a number of defendants, the plaintiff was only entitled to a single
full recovery-multiple recoveries of damages are not permitted.32 The
plaintiffs ability to recover the whole award from a single defendant is
particularly important when other defendants are insolvent or lacked the
24. HENDERSON, supra note 18.
25. Peck, supra note 21, at 235.
26. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 235, 588 P.2d 1308,
1312 (1978).
27. See Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wash. App. 599, 601, 557 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1976); Litts v.
Pierce County, 5 Wash. App. 531, 536 n.1, 488 P.2d 785, 789 n.I (1971) (citing Alexander v. Ham-
marberg, 230 P.2d 399 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951)).
28. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 235, 588 P.2d at 1312; see also Fugere v. Pierce, 5
Wash. App. 592, 596, 490 P.2d 132, 134 (1971) (endorsing the holding of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d
I (Cal. 1948)).
29. Seattle First Nat 'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 235 n.3, 588 P.2d at 1312 n.3.
30. Phennah v. Whalen, 28 Wash. App. 19, 21, 621 P.2d 1304, 1306 (1980) (the plaintiff was
injured in two unrelated automobile accidents, but the injuries could not be segregated between the
separate tortious incidents as plaintiff's doctor testified that it was "impossible to state which acci-
dent caused what degree of injury and permanence.").
31. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 416-18 (4th ed. 1971).
32. Peck, supra note 21, at 236.
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resources to pay their share of the judgment.33 Subsequently, the chosen
defendant is left to seek contribution from the other defendants after pay-
ing the entire award to the plaintiff.34 At common law, however, contri-
bution was not allowed between joint tortfeasors, and the paying defen-
dant was left without any legal recourse against the other tortfeasors to
compel them to share the burden of liability.35 Many states have now
adopted statutes which permit contribution in one form or another,36 in-
cluding Washington, which established that right in 1981.37
B. The Introduction of Comparative Negligence
As the doctrine of joint and several liability has developed, so too
has the rule of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence acts as a
complete bar to recovery,38 even if the plaintiff is only slightly at fault.
39
This complete bar to recovery rule, like the denial of contribution, was
highly criticized, and, as a result, has been replaced in almost every ju-
risdiction by a form of comparative negligence.40 Comparative negli-
gence permits a plaintiff who is partially at fault for his or her injuries to
recover damages that may be reduced, but not necessarily eliminated, in
proportion to the plaintiffs own fault.4 1 The comparative negligence rule
was adopted in order to avoid the harshness of the contributory negli-
gence rule and to facilitate recoveries by injured parties, thereby serving
the compensatory function of tort law.42
Washington adopted a "pure" comparative negligence scheme in
1973.43 Pure comparative negligence allows the plaintiff to recover dam-
ages attributed to the defendant's percentage of fault, regardless of the
percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff's per-
centage is greater than the defendant's. 44 Other jurisdictions have
adopted "modified" comparative negligence, creating certain exceptions
33. Julie K. Weaver, Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in Washington State, 67
WASH. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1992) (citing to Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several
Liability: A Case for Reform, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (1988)).
34. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 305, 307.
35. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 128.
36. Id.
37. 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 118-19 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040-.060 (1982,
1981, & 1987)). Contribution between tortfeasors in Washington is based on their comparative fault.
Peck, supra note 21, at 237.
38. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 360.
39. Peck, supra note 21, at 236.
40. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 360.
4 I. Id.; Peck, supra note 21, at 237.
42. Peck, supra note 21, at 237.
43. 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 949-50 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.015 (1981)).
44. Peck, supra note 21, at 237.
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to the plaintiff's per se recovery under pure comparative negligence re-
gimes.45
Even with the ratification of comparative negligence and its modi-
fied forms, joint and several liability still applies to multiple tortfeasors
within these jurisdictions. Two decisive Washington cases, decided be-
fore the Tort Reform Act of 1986, helped to define the relationship be-
tween joint and several liability and pure comparative negligence.
First, Washington courts have held that the doctrine of joint and
several liability remains alive and well within a comparative negligence
regime. In Seattle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co. ,46 the
Washington Supreme Court declined to abolish or modify joint and sev-
eral liability, even after the statutory adoption of comparative negligence,
although it expressly recognized that the legislature had the power to
make such a change.47 George Stanford was electrocuted when the boom
of the truck on which he was working came in contact with a high-
energy power line.48 Seattle First National Bank, as personal representa-
tive for the Stanford estate, brought an action for wrongful death against
Shoreline Concrete Co. and Dico Corp., the owner and manufacturer of
the boom, respectively. 49 Shoreline and Dico sought indemnity and con-
tribution from a third-party defendant, Stanford's employer, Batterman
Engineering and Construction Co.50 The trial court ordered the jury to
apportion liability among the defendants based on their share of fault for
the plaintiffs injuries. 5 1 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court, holding that comparative negligence had not abol-
ished joint and several liability. 5
2
The court gave multiple reasons for the continued vitality of joint
and several liability. First, because the goal of a comparative negligence
regime is to achieve greater fairness in tort law by allowing even con-
tributorily negligent plaintiffs to recover,5 3 the abolition of joint and sev-
eral liability would undercut this purpose and result in a deterioration of
tort law reform by preventing recovery by injured plaintiffs. Second, the
45. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 362 (for example, a plaintiff whose negligence equals or
exceeds the defendant's negligence is barred from recovery, or a plaintiff whose negligence exceeds
that of the defendant is barred from recovery).
46. 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
47. Id. at 236-37, 588 P.2d at 1313.
48. Id. at 232, 588 P.2d at 1311.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 233, 588 P.2d at 1311.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 236-37, 588 P.2d at 1313.
53. Id. at 236, 588 P.2d at 1313; see also Wenatchee Wenoke Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp.,
89 Wash. 2d 847, 849-50, 576 P.2d 388, 389 (1978); Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 964-65,
530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1981).
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court reasoned that since four other state legislatures modified the rule of
joint and several liability when enacting comparative negligence stat-
utes,54 the fact that our legislature did not presumes that our legislature
did not intend a similar change.55 Third, the court explained that because
joint and several liability is premised upon causation and the indivisibil-
ity of the harm caused, the fact "[tihat it may be possible to assign a per-
centage figure to the relative culpability of multiple tortfeasors does not
detract from the preliminary fact that [e]ach tortfeasor's conduct was [a]
proximate cause of an entire indivisible injury. 56 Fourth, the abolition of
joint and several liability would be incompatible with the compensatory
purpose of tort law, especially in the case of a completely faultless plain-
tiff who could be forced to accept a portion of the loss if any tortfeasor
should prove to be insolvent. 57 Finally, the court noted that even where a
plaintiff is partially at fault, a plaintiff's negligence is non-tortious since
it relates to a failure to use due care for his own protection; whereas a
defendant's negligence is tortious since it relates to a failure to use due
care for the safety of others.58
The court also addressed contribution and its effects on joint and
several liability. The court recognized that the purpose of contribution
was to distribute the payment of damages equitably among multiple tort-
feasors. 59 Contribution has no effect on the plaintiffs right to recover
from the multiple tortfeasors, nor has it been used as a vehicle for re-
stricting a plaintiffs right to seek full compensation from the tortfeasor
of his choosing.60 Moreover, "[w]hat may be equitable [b]etween multi-
54. Seattle First Nat I Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
258a (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1986); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1969).
55. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313. ("As Professor Schwartz
notes in his treatise on comparative negligence: [t]he concept of joint and several liability of tort-
feasors has been retained under comparative negligence, unless the statute specifically abolishes it,
in all states that have been called upon to decide the question.") (citing VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.4 (1974))).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 237-238, 588 P.2d at 1313-14 (emphasis added); see also WASH. STATE S. SELECT
COMM. ON TORT & PROD. LIAB. REFORM, FINAL REP., 47TH LEG. REG. SESS. 20-23 (1981):
The Select Committee believes that the rule on joint and several liability should continue
to be recognized in this state. It concedes that the effect of this rule may be to require a
partially at fault defendant to pay more than his or her share of the joint defendants' li-
ability in certain cases. This unfairness should be ameliorated in most cases by the crea-
tion of a right of contribution among tortfeasors. In those cases where it is not, the Select
Committee feels that a defendant rather than the plaintiff should bear the burden of that
unfairness.
Id.
58. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 238, 588 P.2d at 1314.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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pie tortfeasors is an issue totally divorced from what is fair to the injured
party. ,6 For these reasons, the court held that the legislature's adoption
of a comparative negligence scheme did not dictate the demise of joint
and several liability.62
Not only did the courts reaffirm the applicability of joint and sev-
eral liability, but they also placed the burden on defendants to prove the
allocation of damages amongst themselves. In Phennah v. Whalen,63 the
Washington Court of Appeals faced the problem of determining which
party should carry the burden of proof in allocating damages when mul-
tiple defendants have caused an indivisible harm. Plaintiff Dorothy E.
Phennah was injured in two unrelated automobile accidents occurring
three months apart; the accidents aggravated Phennah's pre-existing os-
teo-arthritic condition, resulting in a permanent injury.64 Phennah sought
damages for her permanent injury from the two drivers, but the trial court
dismissed the case because she failed to proffer an evidentiary basis for
the segregation of damages among successive tortfeasors. 65 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that once a plaintiff proves that successive neg-
ligent defendants have caused some damage, the burden of proof shifts to
those defendants to allocate their damages. And, should the jury find the
plaintiff's injury to be indivisible, those defendants would be jointly and
severally liable.66
The court initially analyzed prior cases in which the characteriza-
tion of the tortfeasor determined the type of liability to be imposed.
Phennah claimed that defendants were concurrent tortfeasors, which
meant that the court would impose joint and several liability, but the de-
fendants claimed that they were successive tortfeasors, which only re-
quired the imposition of several liability.67 The court reviewed the char-
acterizations utilized by the court in Seattle First National Bank and de-
termined that the relevant factor in determining whether tortfeasors are
joint, concurrent, or successive is not the divisibility of the harm, but the
manner in which the occurrences took place.68 However, under the facts
of Phennah, an anomaly in the law surfaced when only one harm re-
61. Id. at 236, 588 P.2d at 1313.
62. Id.
63.28 Wash. App. 19, 621 P.2d 1304 (1980).
64. Id. at 21, 621 P.2d at 1306 (plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Scott Wisner, "testified that
while neither accident caused Phennah's arthritic condition, each affected the severity and perma-
nence of her disability and that it is impossible to state which accident caused what degree of injury
and permanence.").
65. Id. at 21-22, 621 P.2d at 1306.
66. Id. at 29, 621 P.2d at 1310.
67. Id. at 23, 621 P.2d at 1307.
68. Id.
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suited from the defendants' independent actions.69 The court found that
the determinative factor in deciding what type of liability should be im-
posed was not based on characterization of the tortfeasors, but instead
was simply a question of who should carry the burden of segregating the
damages.7°
Thus, the court eventually decided that when the harm is indivisible
among successive tortfeasors, the defendants must bear the burden of
proving allocation of the damages among themselves.71 In fashioning this
rule, the court followed and adopted the approach of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. According to the Restatement, the first determination
courts should make is whether the harm is segregable:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two
or more causes. 72
Based on the factual determination made in this initial step, the court
may rule as to whether the tortfeasors are severally or jointly liable. If the
court finds that the harm is not segregable, then it must follow the next
section which states:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to
bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors
seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of
apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the appor-
tionment is upon each such actor.73
The Restatement method thus can be summed up as follows: First, a
court must factually determine whether under section 433A of the Re-
statement the harm is segregable, and, if so, the tortfeasors are either
severally or jointly liable; second, if the harm is not segregable, then sec-
tion 433B of the Restatement allocates to the tortfeasors the burden of
proving apportionment among themselves.
In sum, despite the legislature's adoption of a pure comparative
negligence scheme, Washington courts were unsatisfied that the legisla-
ture intended to abolish joint and several liability as it had existed under
69. Id. at 24, 621 P.2d at 1307.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 26-29, 621 P.2d at 1309-10.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
73. Id. § 433B(2).
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common law. Furthermore, the courts remained steadfast to the main
purpose of tort law: providing compensatory measures to those who have
been injured. Joint and several liability is one mechanism recognized by
courts through which such measures may be accomplished. Is this reaf-
firmance of joint and several liability within a comparative fault scheme
justified?
There are many well-reasoned arguments as to why joint and sev-
eral liability has outlived its usefulness within a comparative fault
scheme. The fundamental argument for abandoning the concept of joint
and several liability arises from the very purpose of the doctrine of com-
parative fault itself; specifically, that "responsibility for harm done
should be distributed in proportion to the fault of all of the parties in-
volved and not governed by concepts of causation. 74 Thus, according to
this argument, a plaintiff may recover despite fault, and if his or her
damages award is reduced in proportion to that fault, it is unjust to im-
pose on a tortfeasor a liability greater than the proportionate fault of the
tortfeasor whose wrongdoing combined with the conduct of the plaintiff
and other parties to cause the harm.75 This argument is more persuasive
in circumstances where a plaintiff targets a relatively wealthy defendant
to cover the entire liability for harm simply because his ability to pay
makes him the ideal candidate, even when that defendant's proportionate
fault is less than that of other tortfeasors who also caused the harm.76 The
argument becomes stronger still if "full recovery is permitted from such
a target defendant by a plaintiff whose proportionate fault was greater
than the fault of the target defendant." 77
But the theory that gives strength to this argument is the very thing
that breaks it down. The argument relies on the premise that as a plain-
tiff's own proportionate liability rises, so too does the case for the elimi-
nation of joint and several liability. The converse, then, must also be
true: as a plaintiffs own proportionate liability falls, so too does the case
for proportionate liability. Where the plaintiff has had no hand in causing
his own injuries, all defendants should be jointly and severally liability
for the plaintiffs damages. These arguments should be kept in mind as
the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is discussed.
74. Peck, supra note 21, at 238.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 29:729
C. The Tort Reform Act of 1986:
Washington's Answer to Balancing Two Sides of the Same Coin
Washington has undergone significant reform in the area of tort
law. As stated earlier, Washington adopted a pure comparative negli-
gence scheme in 1973.78 Then, for the first time in Washington's history,
a 1981 Act authorized tortfeasors to bring actions for contribution. 79 But
the most important change to Washington tort law came with the Tort
Reform Act of 1986, which comprehensively modified the doctrine of
joint and several liability.80
The Washington State Legislature intended two specific results
when it ratified the Tort Reform Act of 1986. The relevant language of
the Preamble states, "The purpose of this chapter is to enact further re-
forms in order to create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk
of injury and increase the availability and affordability of insurance." 81
Thus, the legislature intended to allocate the responsibility of paying
78. 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 949-50 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.015 (1981)).
79. 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 118 (codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040 and .050 (1982 &
1981)).
80. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.160 (1986).
81. 1986 Wash. Sess. Laws 1354-55 (emphasis added). The Preamble in full states the follow-
ing:
Tort law in this state has generally been developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
While this process has resulted in some significant changes in the law, including amelio-
ration of the harshness of many common law doctrines, the legislature has periodically
intervened in order to bring about needed reforms. The purpose of this chapter is to enact
further reforms in order to create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of in-
jury and increase the availability and affordability of insurance.
The legislature finds that counties, cities, and other governmental entities are faced
with increased exposure to lawsuits and awards and dramatic increases in the cost of in-
surance coverage. These escalating costs ultimately affect the public through higher
taxes, loss of essential services, and loss of the protection provided by adequate insur-
ance. In order to improve the availability and affordability of quality governmental ser-
vices, comprehensive reform is necessary.
The legislature also finds comparable cost increases in professional liability insur-
ance. Escalating malpractice insurance premiums discourage physicians and other health
care providers from initiating or continuing their practice or offering needed services to
the public and contribute to the rising costs of consumer health care. Other professionals,
such as architects and engineers, face similar difficult choices, financial instability, and
unlimited risk in providing services to the public.
The legislature also finds that general liability insurance is becoming unavailable or
unaffordable to many businesses, individuals, and nonprofit organizations in amounts
sufficient to cover potential losses. High premiums have discouraged socially and eco-
nomically desirable activities and encourage many to go without adequate insurance cov-
erage.
Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to reduce costs associated with the tort sys-
tem, while assuring that adequate and appropriate compensation for persons injured
through the fault of others is available.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.160 (1986).
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damages more fairly, as well as to reduce the cost of insurance. How,
then, did the purpose of the Tort Reform Act affect and modify the doc-
trine of joint and several liability?
The application of joint and several liability allowed a plaintiff to
collect an entire damage award from business or government entities,
even when those entities were responsible for only a small percentage of
fault. The unfortunate effect of the application of joint and several liabil-
ity in these circumstances was an escalation in the costs of insurance.
The legislature found that "the increased insurance costs discouraged
private businesses and organizations from engaging in socially and eco-
nomically desirable activities, and caused governmental entities to re-
duce services., 82 The legislature was persuaded by the contention that
government and business insurance carriers were forced to raise their
rates due to large losses caused by the existing tort system's potential for
placing liability on defendants only marginally responsible for the plain-
tiff's harm.83 Lower insurance premiums would allow government to use
the savings to provide services, and would allow businesses to continue
operations. 84 The legislature hoped to decrease the losses of insurance
companies, which presumably would enable them to charge lower pre-
miums, by eliminating the application of joint and several liability when
a plaintiff was partially responsible for the harm. 85 Significantly, and as
argued above, the legislative history does not indicate that the legislature
intended to eliminate the application of joint and several liability when
the plaintiff was fault free.
The legislature's other intended purpose was to achieve an equita-
ble distribution of cost and risk of injury by abrogating or modifying
joint and several liability in certain situations. 86 The Washington Su-
preme Court held that the Act makes it clear that "[proportionate] liabil-
ity is now intended to be the general rule" and that proportionate liabil-
ity87 "is in fact an exception that has all but swallowed the general
82. Weaver, supra note 33, at 460.
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; Peck, supra note 21, at 238; Weaver, supra note
33, at 460.
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85. Peck, supra note 21, at 238; Weaver, supra note 33, at 460-61.
86. Stewart A. Estes, The Short Happy Life of Litigation Between Torifeasors: Contribution,
Indemnification and Subrogation after Washington's Tort Reform Acts, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69,
76 (1997); Gregory C. Sisk, Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and Several Liabil-
ity: Resisting the Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 6 (1992); see also
Weaver, supra note 33, at 473.
87. Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 294, 840 P.2d 860, 886 (1992); see also
Kottler v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 437, 443-45, 963 P.2d 834, 838-39 (1998). Commentators have
critically noted that the classical use of the term "several" indicated a tortfeasor's responsibility for
the entire harm at common law. Gregory C. Sisk, The Constitutional Validity of the Modification of
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rule. 88 Members of the legislature expounded on the need for legislation
to correct the unfair application of the joint and several liability doctrine
to defendants only partially at fault who were subsequently held liable
for the entire amount of damages. 89 The Washington legislators well un-
derstood that they were limiting the doctrine of joint and several liability
only to situations where the plaintiff is not contributorily negligent.90
This legislative understanding makes sense when considering the prem-
ise of the comparative negligence scheme because when a plaintiff is
fault free there is nothing with which to "compare" the defendants' fault.
Moreover, no general rule is without its limitations and exceptions. Lim-
iting the application of the joint and several liability doctrine to those
cases which involve a partially at-fault plaintiff is consistent with both
the legislature's intent and the compensatory nature of tort law. It is im-
Joint and Several Liability in the Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
433, 440 (1990); Bryan P. Hametiaux, RCW 4.22.070, Joint and Several Liability, and the Indivisi-
bility of Harm, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 193, 198 n.19 (1991/1992). Whatever may have been the technical
meaning of the term "several" liability at common law, the meaning of the term in a statute must be
drawn from its context in that statute. Title 4, chapter 22, section 070(l) of the Revised Code of
Washington provides for "several only" liability as part of a provision stating that judgment shall be
entered against each defendant "in an amount which represents that party's proportionate share of
the claimant's total damages." The context makes clear that the term "several only" liability refers
to liability that is limited to a defendant's proportionate share of the damages based on percentage of
individual fault. Id.; see also Peck, supra note 21, at 239 n.20 (the word "several" is used differently
in the statute than at common law and refers to a tortfeasor's "proportionate share of the plaintiffs
total damages"). Cf Weaver, supra note 33, at 460 n. 16 ("In section I(b), however, "several" means
the sum of the amounts for which all of the defendants are liable. This second meaning is different
from the meaning used in the first paragraph and the common law meaning."). "Proportionate liabil-
ity" is the more accurate term. Harnetiaux, supra, at 198 n. 19.
88. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 294 n.7, 840 P.2d at 886 n.7.
89. See, e.g., S.J., 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 466 (Wash. 1986) (legislation adopts
"good public policy to have those persons who have contributed to the problem pay proportionate to
their contribution.") (remarks of Sen. Thompson); H.J., 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1065 (Wash.
1986) (describing the economic harm to society of holding a defendant that is only ten percent re-
sponsible for an injury liable for the entire amount of the damages simply because another tortfeasor
is insolvent) (remarks of Rep. Ballard); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1993) (com-
manding trier of fact to "determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every
entity which caused" the injury or harm, and providing that the "liability of each defendant shall be
several only and shall not be joint" unless the case falls within certain narrow limitations and excep-
tions); S.J., 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 1486 (Wash. 1986) (changes in joint and several liabil-
ity were adopted to deal with unfairness of situation in which someone is found "fifty percent negli-
gent in the accident" and yet is left "paying the total cost.") (remarks of Sen. Hayner); H.J., 49th
Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1067-68 (Wash. 1986) (explaining that joint and several liability concept
needed to be corrected because "it allows one person to be held liable for another person's fault to
some extent.") (remarks of Rep. Barnes); see also Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D. Ind.
1987) (the provisions of Indiana's comparative fault statute "signal a legislative policy favoring the
principle of fair allocation among all tortfeasors," and "[a]ny interpretation of legislative intent must
therefore be made with a cognizance of this policy.").
90. See, e.g., S.J., 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 466 (Wash. 1986) (when the plaintiff is
also at fault "joint and several liability goes out the door.") (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
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portant to keep in mind this distinction between the limitation, on one
hand, and complete abrogation, on the other hand, of joint and several
liability.
The centerpiece of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is codified at title
4, chapter 22, section 070 of the Revised Code of Washington.9' With
this single provision, the Washington Legislature established a new
foundation for tort liability-individual responsibility in direct propor-
tion to individual fault.92 Although section 070 establishes a general rule
of comparative responsibility among tortfeasors, it also establishes cer-
tain exceptions in the contexts of vicarious liability and the innocent
plaintiff, as well as three explicitly enumerated limitations within the
statute.93 Thus, under the statute, a defendant's liability is several only,
unless: (1) the plaintiff is not at fault; 94 (2) the defendant is acting in con-
cert with another person;95 (3) the person at fault is acting as an agent of
the defendant; 96 or (4) the case falls within one of the three exceptions to
the statute.9 7
Two main themes run through section 070. First, when the plaintiff
is also at fault, defendants should not be held liable for more than their
own share of the damages as determined by their proportionate fault.
98
This limitation on liability reflects the basic premise of a comparative
fault scheme and is consistent with the legislature's intent. Second,
"when a potential defendant has not been added to the lawsuit because of
a legal immunity or impediment, or simply by reason of the plaintiffs
voluntary choice or neglect, no other defendant may be forced to assume
that share of the liability." 99 In other words, a plaintiff may not collect an
unnamed defendant's share of an award from the other defendants that
have been named. Thus, a Tegman scenario, which involves a fault-free
plaintiff who claims joint and several liability against all named defen-
dants where there are no other possible defendants, is consistent within
the framework of these two main themes.
While section 070 may appear to be merely an exception to the
general rule, the Washington Supreme Court has consistently stated that
this statute is an exception that has "all but swallowed the general
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1993).
92. Sisk, supra note 86, at 6.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(a)-(c) (1993); see also Peck, supra note 21, at 243; Sisk,
supra note 86, at 121; Weaver, supra note 33, at 460 n.17.
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1993).
95. Id. § 4.22.070(1)(a).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 070(3)(a)-(c).
98. Sisk, supra note 86, at 18.
99. Id.
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rule."'' 0 Thus, several only, or proportionate, liability is now the general
rule. 10 1 Where the plaintiff is partially at fault, 0 2 the statute requires that
courts undertake a two-step approach to apportion liability according to
the level of responsibility. 0 3 First, the statute provides that "the trier of
fact shall determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable
to every entity .... ,,104 This language means that the trier of fact allo-
cates fault to every entity, whether a party or not, that played any part in
causing the plaintiff's damages. Second, the statute provides that the
court shall enter judgment against each defendant for "that party's pro-
portionate share of the claimant's total damages."' 1 5 Defendants found at
fault by judgment are fully responsible for their proportionate share of
the damages, but the defendants are not liable, however, for that part of
the damages attributable to the fault of an entity that has not been made a
party to the action or that was joined as a defendant but was released be-
fore judgment. 10 6 Therefore, under the general rule of proportionate li-
ability, even if none of the defendants is insolvent, a plaintiff may still
not receive a full recovery, either because they overlooked possible de-
fendants who were not named in the suit or because the court determined
that there were other defendants who contributed to causing plaintiffs
S•• 107injuries.
However, when the plaintiff is fault free and without culpability,
the rules of comparative responsibility are set aside and the defendants
remain jointly and severally liable.10 8 Section 070(1) provides two excep-
100. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 2d 847, 850, 873 P.2d 489, 491 (1994);
Gerrard v. Craig, 122 Wash. 2d 288, 292, 857 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1993); Washburn v. Beatt Equip.
Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 294 n.7, 840 P.2d 860, 886 n.7 (1992). See also Thomas V. Harris, Washing-
ton's 1986 Tort Reform Act: Partial Tort Settlements After the Demise of Joint and Several Liability,
22 GONZ. L. REV. 67, 67-68 (1986/1987); Peck, supra note 21, at 243-44; Hametiaux, supra note
86, at 195; Sisk, supra note 86, at 14.
101. See supra text accompanying note 87.
102. Sisk, supra note 86, at 112 (Title 4, chapter 22, section 070 of the Revised Code of Wash-
ington draws a distinction between the innocent and the culpable plaintiff).
103. Id. at 90.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1993).
105. Id.
106. Sisk, supra note 86, at 43.
107. Id. at 93 (see the mathematical approach example under Table I which contemplates
allocation of twenty percent fault to an unjoined entity which would not be awarded).
108. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(l)(b) (1993); Peck, supra note 21, at 243-44 (statute
preserves joint and several liability in those cases in which a plaintiff is not at fault, but that liability
is limited to the sum of the proportionate shares of fault of the defendants against whom judgment is
entered); Sisk, supra note 86, at 112 (under paragraph (l)(b), if the plaintiff or claimant is without
fault, the defendants to the action remain jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff); Weaver, supra
note 33, at 457 (under Washington's modified doctrine of joint and several liability, joint liability
between defendants exists only if the plaintiff is free from fault).
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tions'0 9 for joint and several liability among defendants: "factual" and
"procedural" joint and several liability.1 ° The first exception applies
once the court has made a factual determination either that an agency or
employment relationship exists, or that the defendants acted in concert."'
The second exception applies when the plaintiff is fault free and there is
an entry of judgment against multiple defendants.'
2
Factual joint and several liability arises when a person acts as the
agent or servant of a party, or when both are acting in concert." 3 The
legislature intended the term "acting in concert" to require two or more
people consciously acting in concert in an unlawful manner." 4 This nar-
row definition excludes concurrent tortfeasors by requiring that the ac-
tors consciously combine their actions; it also excludes co-conspirators
by requiring that each of the actors actively participate in the unlawful
conduct. 5 "Acting in concert" does not require that the defendants in-
tend to harm the plaintiff-only that the actors consciously act together
in an unlawful manner. 16
Procedural joint and several liability arises when the claimant is
free of fault and judgment is entered against multiple defendants." 7 At
common law, the plaintiff could single out one of multiple defendants
and force that defendant to pay for the entire harm." 8 Procedural joint
and several liability, then, is a modified version of the common law rule.
Simply stated, when a plaintiff is fault free, only those defendants against
whom judgment is entered are liable, and only for the sum of their pro-
portionate shares of the plaintiffs total damages. 19 Defendants are gen-
erally not liable for the share of any at-fault entity that has no judgment
109. Note that there is a distinction between the exceptions to the general rule of several, or
proportionate liability, and those specific enumerated situations that are out of the purview of the
general rule. Claims which are out of the general rule and which remain subject to common law joint
and several liability are hazardous wastes or substances (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(a)
(1993)), tortious interference with a contract or business relationship (Id. § 4.22.070(3)(b)), and
fungible product claims (Id. § 4.22.070(3)(c)).
I 10. Estes, supra note 86, at 69-70.
Ill. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1993).
112. See id. § 070(l)(b).
113. See id. § 070(l)(a).
114. Kottler v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 437, 448-49, 963 P.2d 834, 841 (1998); Gilbert H. Moen
Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 75 Wash. App. 480, 485-87, 878 P.2d 1246, 1249-50 (1994).
115. Moen, 75 Wash. App. at 486, 878 P.2d at 1249.
116. Id. (citing Sisk, supra note 86, at 108).
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1993).
118. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 307; Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91
Wash. 2d 230, 236, 588 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (1978).
119. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(I)(b) (1993).
Seattle University Law Review
entered against it.120 Thus, a plaintiff may hold multiple defendants
jointly and severally liable if he can factually establish an employment or
agency relationship or conspiracy, or if he can procedurally obtain entry
of a judgment against multiple defendants and the plaintiff is determined
to be free from fault.
A review of some influential Washington cases decided after the
enactment of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 and section 070 may illustrate
the modified doctrine of joint and several liability.
As the courts did prior to the Tort Reform Act, courts reaffirmed
that the doctrine of joint and several liability did indeed have a place in
Washington jurisprudence after the Act's ratification. In Washburn v.
Beatt Equipment Co., 121 the Washington Supreme Court thoroughly ana-
lyzed section 070. Plaintiff Norman Washburn was severely burned and
permanently injured when a standby propane fuel system caught fire and
exploded. 122 Prior to trial, three defendants settled and were released by
the plaintiff (Petrolane, Inc., paid $780,000; Buckeye Gas Products
Company paid $520,000; and Washington Natural Gas paid
$210,000).123 At trial, the jury apportioned fault among all the entities
they determined had caused plaintiffs injuries, as required under section
070(1).124 The jury found defendant Beatt eighty percent at fault; Petro-
lane, Inc., twenty percent at fault; and all other entities free from fault. 125
The jury awarded a total amount of $8 million and the trial court entered
judgment against Beatt for a net amount of $5,670,000.126 The court
reached this amount by calculating eighty percent of $8 million for a re-
sult of $6,400,000, and by reducing that award by the amount paid by the
settling defendants that were not found to be at fault. 127 The plaintiff
claimed that the trial court erred in calculating the judgment amount
128against Beatt.
The Washington Supreme Court held that since the jury found Beatt
eighty percent at fault, Beatt must pay eighty percent of the total ver-
dict. 129 The court found that, under section 070(l)(b), defendants may be
held jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's damages where the plain-
120. Anderson v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 2d 847, 852, 873 P.2d 489, 492 (1994); Gerrard v.
Craig, 122 Wash. 2d 288, 292-93, 857 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1993); Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120
Wash. 2d 246, 294, 840 P.2d 860, 886 (1992).
121. 120 Wash. 2d 246, 840 P.2d 860.
122. Id. at 251, 840 P.2d at 864.
123. Id. at 290, 840 P.2d at 884.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 296, 840 P.2d at 887.
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tiff is free from fault. 130 Further, under section 070(1)(b), joint and sev-
eral liability is imposed only on those defendants against whom judg-
ment is entered and only for the sum of their proportionate shares of
plaintiffs total damages. 131 Because Petrolane had settled prior to trial,
there were no other defendants with whom Beatt could be held jointly
and severally liable. Therefore, Beatt was not entitled to any offset, cred-
its, or contribution under section 070(2). Defendants who have settled or
who have been released and have not had judgment entered against them
within the meaning of section 070(1) are not jointly and severally liable.
In other words, a fault-free plaintiff may hold jointly and severally liable
only those defendants against whom judgment is entered, and not those
who have settled prior to trial.
Because courts do not allow a plaintiff to recover for damages
caused by an unnamed tortfeasor, defendants with judgments entered
against them receive even more relief apart from contribution. In Ander-
son v. City of Seattle,3 2 the Washington Supreme Court held that under
section 070(l)(b), a defendant must be named in the case when the court
enters its final judgment to qualify as a "defendant[] against whom
judgment is entered."'' 33 Here, seven-year-old Marcus Anderson was
struck and killed by Jo Carrie Wilson while he was attempting to cross
the street with his twelve-year-old foster sister, Angela Lamb. 134 One
year later, Wilson filed for bankruptcy and listed Donna Anderson, Mar-
cus's mother, as a potential creditor with an $8 million liability claim. 135
The petition was granted, discharging her from all debts, including the
estimated $8 million claim.' 36 Anderson, in her capacity as personal rep-
resentative for Marcus's estate, subsequently filed suit against Wilson,
Wilson's husband, and the City of Seattle. 137 The Wilsons were later
dismissed with prejudice by an agreed order of dismissal. 138 The trial
court determined that Marcus was zero percent at fault, and the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of Anderson.' 39 The jury apportioned fault be-
tween three entities: Angela Lamb at zero percent; City of Seattle at one
percent; and Wilson at ninety-nine percent. 40 The trial court then held
130. Id. at 294, 840 P.2d at 886.
131. Id., 840 P.2d at 886-87.
132. 123 Wash. 2d 847, 873 P.2d 489 (1994).
133. Id. at 852, 873 P.2d at 492.
134. Id. at 849, 873 P.2d at 490.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 849-50, 873 P.2d at 490.
139. Id. at 850, 873 P.2d at 490.
140. Id.
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the City severally liable for its one percent share,' 4' and Anderson ap-
pealed, claiming the City was jointly and severally liable under section
070.142
The Washington Supreme Court held that the Wilsons were not de-
fendants against whom judgment was entered under any reasonable in-
terpretation of section 070(1)(b).143 The court began its analysis with sec-
tion 070(l)(b), an exception to the general rule of several liability that
retains joint and several liability against multiple tortfeasors when the
plaintiff is fault free. 14 4 In interpreting the statute, the court determined
that the language was plain, unambiguous, and controlling. 45 Under the
plain language of section 070(1)(b), joint and several liability is imposed
only if two events occur: (1) the trier of fact concludes the claimant is
fault free; and (2) judgment is entered against two or more defendants. 146
Thus, because judgment was only entered against one defendant, the City
of Seattle, it was only severally liable for its proportionate share of fault,
regardless of whether other entities were found at fault.
Although Washington courts have made clear that joint and several
liability still exists, its application is limited to a few select situations. 47
Joint and several liability is not applicable when a plaintiff, a negligent
defendant, and an intentional defendant are all liable for a portion of the
damages. In Welch v. Southland Corp. ,48 the Washington Supreme
Court decided whether the statutory definition of "fault"' 14 9 includes in-
tentional tortfeasors, and whether a defendant may apportion liability to
an intentional tortfeasor under section 070. In the early morning hours,
141. Id.
142. Id. at 850, 873 P.2d at 490-91.
143. Id. at 852, 873 P.2d at 492.
144. Id. at 850, 873 P.2d at 491; see also Henderson v. Tyrell, 80 Wash. App. 592, 622-23,
910 P.2d 522, 540 (1996) (statute requiring trier of fact to determine percentage of total fault attrib-
utable to every entity which caused claimant's damages establishes several liability as general rule,
but retains joint and several liability under limited number of circumstances, one of which applies
when fault-free claimant is injured).
145. Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d 851, 873 P.2d at 491 (in interpreting a statute, the Washington
State Supreme Court looks first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by the legisla-
ture (citing Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 668, 771 P.2d 711, 728 (1989)); see also
Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash. 2d 833, 841, 854 P.2d 1061, 1066 (1993) (when a statute is clear
and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to examine legislative history in order to interpret the statute).
146. Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d 851, 873 P.2d at 491; see also Gerrard v. Craig, 122 Wash. 2d
288, 298-99, 857 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1993) (a dismissed defendant cannot be potentially liable to a
plaintiff and thus cannot be a defendant against whom judgment is entered); Washburn v. Beatt
Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 294-95, 840 P.2d 860, 886-87 (1992) (only defendants against
whom judgment is entered are jointly and severally liable and only for the sum of their proportionate
share of the total damages).
147. Welch v. Southland Corp., 134 Wash. 2d 629, 952 P.2d 162 (1998).
148. Id.
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1981).
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plaintiff Mark Welch entered a 7-11 convenience store where another
patron demanded Welch's wallet, shot Welch multiple times, fled, and
was never apprehended.' 50 Welch subsequently brought suit against de-
fendant Southland, the owner of the 7-11, on the grounds that the com-
pany failed to maintain safe premises for its business invitees. 5 ' South-
land pleaded, as an affirmative defense, that fault should be apportioned
between the negligent and intentional actors. 152 Welch moved for partial
summary judgment to strike the defense.1 53 The trial court denied
Welch's motion, holding that "where the plaintiff, a negligent tortfeasor
defendant, and an intentional tortfeasor are all liable, the negligent de-
fendant is entitled to the benefit of the comparative fault statute."' 54
The Washington Supreme Court held that a negligent defendant is
not entitled to apportion liability with an intentional tortfeasor under the
current statutory definition of "fault. 1 55 The court reasoned that both
title 4, chapter 22, sections 015 and 070 of the Revised Code of Wash-
ington are plain and unambiguous.15 6 The court made this determination
from the statutory language alone.1 57 Only if the language were ambigu-
ous are principles of statutory construction applied in order to ascertain
and give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting
them. 158 The court further reasoned that when similar words are used in
different parts of a statute, "the meaning is presumed to be the same
throughout., 159 Thus, for a negligent defendant to apportion liability to
another entity, that entity must be "at fault" within the meaning of sec-
tion 070.
Courts have also continued to uphold the rule that defendants carry
the burden in allocating damages amongst themselves. In Cox v.
Spangler,1 60 the Washington Supreme Court held that the burden of ap-
150. Welch, 134 Wash. 2d at 630-31, 952 P.2d at 163.
151. Id. at 631, 952 P.2d at 163.
152. Id., 952 P.2d at 163-64.
153. Id., 952 P.2d at 164.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 636-37, 952 P.2d at 166.
156. Id. at 634, 952 P.2d at 165.
157. Id.; accord Morgan v. Johnson, 137 Wash. 2d 887, 891-92, 976 P.2d 619, 621 (1999);
Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wash. 2d 325, 329, 815 P.2d 781, 782 (1991); see also Snoho-
mish v. Joslin, 9 Wash. App. 495, 498, 513 P.2d 293, 296 (1973) ("In judicial interpretation of stat-
utes, the first rule is 'the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain
words do not require construction.'").
158. Welch, 134 Wash. 2d at 633, 952 P.2d at 165; see also Morgan, 137 Wash. 2d at 891-92,
976 P.2d at 621; Whateom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303,
1308 (1996).
159. Welch, 134 Wash. 2d at 636, 952 P.2d at 166 (citing Cowles Publ'g Co. v. State Patrol,
109 Wash. 2d 712, 722, 748 P.2d 597, 603 (1988)).
160. 141 Wash. 2d 431, 5 P.3d 1265 (2000).
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portioning damages is on the defendant. 161 On May 19, 1993, while
plaintiff Deborah E. Cox was in a vehicle stopped at a gate while at
work, a co-employee accidentally rear-ended Cox.' 62 The impact and
damage to the vehicle was relatively minor, but Cox immediately experi-
enced headache and neck pains. 163 Her examining doctor concluded that
she had suffered neck and lumbar spine strain, and over the next six
months, Cox continued to suffer from the strain. 64 By November 1993,
Cox's headaches had stopped and the pain in her neck diminished, but
unfortunately Cox was involved in another accident on November 2,
1993.165 While Cox's vehicle was stopped at a crosswalk, with another
car driven by Maryanne Hummel stopped approximately five feet behind
Cox, Spangler, unable to stop her vehicle, rear-ended Hummel and
shoved Hummel's vehicle into the back of Cox's vehicle. 166 Cox com-
plained of pain in the previously affected neck and upper back area, and
for the first time, a lower back ache that radiated down her right hip and
leg. 167 An independent medical examiner concluded that, with the excep-
tion of the lumbar strain, her injuries were a result of a "combination of
the two accidents.', 68 At trial, the jury was instructed that Spangler bore
the burden of apportioning damages for the injuries if it found Cox's in-
juries to be indivisible, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Cox.' 69
Spangler appealed, claiming error in the jury instructions regarding ap-
portionment; but the court of appeals affirmed. 70
The Washington Supreme Court also affirmed, supporting the bur-
den-shifting scheme of Phennah by applying section 433B(2) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. 171 The court reasoned that although the case
was distinguishable from Phennah in that joint and several liability was
not imposed, 172 the key similarity between these cases was the indivisi-
bility of the plaintiffs injuries. 173 Because the injuries were not segrega-
161. Id. at 442-43, 5 P.3d at 1271 (loosely derived from Phennah v. Walen, 28 Wash. App. 19,
621 P.2d 1304 (1980)).
162. Id. at 434, 5 P.3d 1266-67.
163. Id., 5 P.3d at 1267.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 435, 5 P.3d at 1267.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 436, 5 P.3d at 1268.
169. Id. at 437-38, 5 P.3d at 1268.
170. Id. at 438, 5 P.3d at 1268.
171. Id. at 444, 5 P.3d at 1271 ("The exception in subsection (2) is grounded in the policy that:
'as between the proved tortfeasor who has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plain-
tiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the harm caused should fall upon the
former."') (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4331B(2) cmt. d).
172. Id. at 445-46, 5 P.3d at 1272.
173. Id. at 446, 5 P.3d at 1273.
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ble, it was the defendant's burden to apportion damages for those injuries
that she proximately caused. 7 4 This case is also further distinguished
from Phennah, and other cases for that matter, because it concerns one of
those unusual cases that deal not with an apportionment of fault or liabil-
ity, but rather an attempt to sever two distinct events, both of which con-
tributed to a truly single and indivisible injury.
Neither the Welch court nor the Cox court was presented with the
issue of whether, under section 070(1)(b), joint and several liability may
be applied to a negligent defendant and an intentional defendant when a
plaintiff is fault free.' 75 The Washington Supreme Court recently re-
ceived an opportunity to resolve this question in Tegman.
III. THE OVERTHROW OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
BY JUDICIAL FIAT
With an understanding of the evolution of the doctrine of joint and
several liability, the unprecedented and controversial decision in Tegman
can be more readily criticized. This Part will discuss the Tegman case in
detail and will critically analyze the majority's reasoning. This Part will
then briefly survey other jurisdictions' handling of this issue, and con-
clude by suggesting potential solutions if the Tegman rule should other-
wise stand.
A. Tegman v. Accident & Medical Investigations, Inc.:
A Story of Injustice Towards Fault-Free Plaintiffs
After having sustained injuries from a car accident on April 26,
1989, Maria Tegman hired G. Richard McClellan and his company, Ac-
cident & Medical Investigations, Inc. (AMI), to represent her in the han-
dling of her personal injury claims.176 Tegman believed McClellan was a
licensed attorney and that AMI was a law firm.177
Instances of McClellan's misconduct were numerous and pervasive.
Despite his claims, McClellan had never been an attorney in any jurisdic-
tion. 178 Nonetheless, he entered into contingency fee agreements with
clients.' 79 McClellan also negotiated settlements and processed the pro-
ceeds of the settlements through his own bank account rather than the
174. Id. at 447, 5 P.3d at 1273.
175. Remember that in Welch, all of the parties were found liable, including the plaintiff. See
discussion supra Part II.C. This is distinguished from Tegman, a case of first impression, where the
plaintiff is fault-free. See discussion infra Part III.A.
176. Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 102, 105, 75 P.3d 497,
498 (2003).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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required legal trust account.' 80 In December 1991, McClellan settled
Tegman's case for $35,000 without her knowledge or consent, forged her
signature on the settlement check, and deposited the settlement funds
into his personal account. 181 McClellan then obtained a "release" from
Tegman after which he sent her a check for what he determined to be the
balance of her share of the settlement proceeds. 182 McClellan was not
alone, however, in misconduct.
McClellan and AMI also hired attorneys and paralegals. One of the
attorneys was Lorinda Noble, who worked about six months before re-
signing her position in May 1991.183 Noble knew that McClellan held
himself out as an attorney even though he was not, that he entered into
contingency fee agreements with clients, and that proceeds from settled
cases were placed into McClellan's personal account instead of a trust
account.184 Noble, who worked on Tegman's case, never informed Teg-
man that McClellan was not an attorney, never informed the Washington
State Bar Association that clients were not being properly advised of the
status of their cases, or that fees were being shared with non-lawyers. 85
Two years later, in 1993, Tegman and others filed suit against mul-
tiple parties, including McClellan, AMI, and Noble, alleging "negli-
gence, the unauthorized practice of law, legal malpractice, breach of fi-
duciary relationship, fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, breach of con-
tract, violation of the Consumer Protection Act [chapter 19.86 RCW],
and criminal profiteering.' ' 186 The trial court granted summary judgment
against McClellan and AMI for all causes of action, found Noble and
others liable for negligence and legal malpractice, found Tegman was not
at fault, awarded damages, and imposed joint and several liability against
all defendants for compensatory damages only.' 87
Noble appealed. She maintained that the trial court's imposition of
joint and several liability among all defendants for the compensatory
award of $15,067.25 was erroneous because she was found to have
committed only negligent torts, while McClellan and AMI were found to
have committed both negligent and intentional torts. Thus, Noble argued
she should be held jointly and severally liable with McClellan and AMI
only for damages based on negligent conduct.' 88 The court of appeals
180. Id.
181. Id. at 106, 75 P.3d at 498.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 105, 75 P.3d at 498.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 106, 75 P.3d at 498.
186. Id. at 106-07, 75 P.3d at 498 (citing Clerk's Papers (CP) (conclusion of law 179) at 776).
187. Tegman, 107 Wash. App. 868, 883-84, 30 P.3d 8, 17-18 (2001).
188. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 107, 75 P.3d at 498-99.
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affirmed, holding that the trial court treated the action against McClellan
and AMI as functionally separate 89 from the action against Noble and
other negligent tortfeasors.190 The Washington Supreme Court granted
Noble's petition for review on the issue of joint and several liability.
Ultimately, the court held that "under RCW 4.22.070 the damages
resulting from negligence must be segregated from those resulting from
intentional acts, and the negligent defendants are jointly and severally
liable only for the damages resulting from their negligence. They are not
jointly and severally liable for damages caused by intentional acts of oth-
ers."'191 Unfortunately, the majority gave no intelligible principle by
which such a calculation of damages could be made.
Although the majority properly began its analysis with a discussion
of the legislature's intent in enacting the Tort Reform Act of 1986, it im-
properly decided the issue by construing legislative intent before looking
to the plain language of the statute. The majority noted that the declared
purpose of the Act was to "enact further reforms in order to create a more
equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the avail-
ability and affordability of insurance."' 92 Thus, by starting with the de-
clared purpose of the statute, the majority attempted to demonstrate that
its ruling did no more than carry out the intention of the drafters and that
the present case fit neatly within the purview of the statute. By contrast,
the dissent, written by Justice Chambers, looked at how the underlying
principles of tort law and tort reform governed the specific issue. He
189. The judgment summary in Tegman's case provides in pertinent part as follows:
Name of Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor: Maria Tegman
Attorney for Judgment Creditor: Gregory D. Lucas
Lucas & Lucas, P.S.
Judgment Debtors: Deloris Mullen
Lorinda Sue Noble
Camille Jescavage
G. Richard McClellan and
Accident & Medical
Investigations, Inc. ("AMI")
Base Judgment Amount: $15,067.25 (All defendants)
Criminal Profiteering: 50,000.00 (McClellan & AMI only)
Consumer Protection 10,000.00 (McClellan & AMI only)
Damages:
Judgment Amount: $75,067.25
Interest Rate: 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid.
Statutory Attorneys' Fees $ 125.00 (All defendants)
Attorneys' Fees: $79,218.50 (McClellan & AMI only)
Tegman, 107 Wash. App. at 885 n.3, 30 P.3d at 18 n.3.
190. Id. at 884-85, 30 P.3d at 17-18.
191. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 105, 75 P.3d at 497.
192. Id. at 108, 75 P.3d at 499 (quoting 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 100; see WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.16.160 (1986)).
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noted that the statute does not specifically address "the several liability
of intentional actors or several liability for negligent and intentional tort-
feasors who together cause an indivisible harm."' 193
Unfortunately, the majority's citation to the preamble is not well
taken. The preamble, which the majority used to interpret legislative in-
tent, is directed toward the availability and affordability of insurance,
specifically the cost of insurance to municipalities, professionals, and
society in general. 194 The legislature was clear on this point when it
stated that "it is the intent of the legislature to reduce costs associated
with the tort system, while assuring that adequate and appropriate com-
pensation for persons injured through the fault of others is available."', 95
In other words, the legislature was attempting to reduce the cost of insur-
ance. But, read in context, this reduction is not to be accomplished at the
cost of sufficient compensation to the innocent plaintiff. 196
The majority next discussed the determination of fault under the
Tort Reform Act. The majority states, and rightfully so, that under the
statutory scheme, fault' 97 does not include intentional acts or omissions
because intentional torts are part of a "wholly different legal realm and
are inapposite to the determination of fault pursuant to section 070(1)."198
Moreover, the majority spent a significant amount of time analyzing the
statute sentence by sentence in an attempt to show that the exception in
section 070(1)(b) was consistent with section 070(1) because only "at-
fault" defendants are contemplated. 199 This lent support to the majority's
general proposition that several liability is the general rule and that joint
and several liability does not apply to negligent and intentional tortfea-
sors. Thus, intentional tortfeasors are not part of the analysis because
they do not fall within the statutory definition of "fault."
However, while the general rule200 may not include intentional acts
or omissions, the exceptions do contemplate them since they stand out-
side the realm of the general rule of several liability. Even assuming that
all words within a section of a statute are to be given the same mean-
201ing, it is only the fault of the plaintiff that is contemplated in section
070(1)(b), not the fault of the defendants. Therefore, the situational ex-
ception defined in section 070(1)(b) is out of the comparative fault realm
193. Id. at 130, 75 P.3d at 510 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see supra Part II.C.
195. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 109, 75 P.3d at 500 (emphasis added).
196. See discussion supra Part II.C.
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1981).
198. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 110, 75 P.3d at 501.
199. Id. at 111-12, 75 P.3d at 500.
200. Id. at 109, 75 P.3d at 499.
201. Welch v. Southland Corp., 134 Wash. 2d 629, 636, 952 P.2d 162, 166 (1988).
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because the plaintiff has no fault to which the defendants' fault may be
compared.20 2 The majority even concedes that section 070(1)(b) is the
exception to the general rule.2 °3 It is called an "exception" for a reason-
that is, an exception is by definition not consistent with its associated
general rule. Otherwise, it would not be an exception!
The majority makes two points that are of particular interest. First,
the majority attempts to distinguish joint and several liability under sec-
tion 070(1)(b) from common law joint and several liability. Because its
specific language indicates that joint and several liability is limited to the
sum of the proportionate shares of the "at-fault defendants," the section
070(l)(b) exception does not mandate full joint and several liability,
even in the case of a fault-free plaintiff.20 4 The majority is generally cor-
rect that joint and several liability under section 070(l)(b) is distin-
guished from common law joint and several liability, but the majority is
incorrect in articulating the reason why. A fault-free plaintiff may not, in
all cases, obtain a "full recovery"--one that "makes the plaintiff
whole"--but only because the exception specifically excludes defendants
who were not named in the suit, defendants who had immunity from suit,
and defendants who were released or never had judgment entered against
them.20 5 Upon the finding of joint and several liability, it is the exclusion
of these defendants that would leave the plaintiff short of full compensa-
tion. There exists no language within the statute or any case law that
makes the "at-fault defendant" distinction that the majority makes.
This lack of support for the "at-fault defendant" distinction leads to
the second point of interest, wherein the majority does in fact insert the
words "at-fault" into the language of the exception. A major point of
contention between the majority and the dissent is whether joint and sev-
eral liability is preserved for fault-free plaintiffs. The majority believes
that the section 070(1)(b) exception only pertains to fault-based damages
and "at-fault defendants, 20 6 while the dissent would hold, "Fault-free
claimants are entitled to joint and several liability against all defendants
against whom judgment is entered for the sum of their proportionate
shares of the claimant's total damages. ' 20 7 The majority attempts to de-
202. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 122-23, 75 P.3d at 506 ("Comparative negligence means com-
parison. The trier of fact compares the negligence of plaintiff and defendant," and allows a negligent
defendant to reduce liability by the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff) (Chambers, J.,
dissenting) (quoting William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 465 n.2
(1953))).
203. Id. at 112, 75 P.3d at 501.
204. Id. at 113-14, 75 P.3d at 501-02.
205. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1993).
206. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 115, 75 P.3d at 502-03.
207. Id. at 131, 75 P.3d at 511 (Chambers, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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flect attention from the actual language of section 070(1)(b) by interpret-
ing the exception as consistent with the general rule. But the exception
should be construed as its own rule outside the domain of the general
rule. Moreover, the court must initially determine whether the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous before applying the statutory cannons
of interpretation and construing the statute in light of the legislature's
purpose and intent.2 °8 Even so, the legislature was aware that it had de-
fined "fault" and that it could have used the words "at-fault defendants"
in section 070(l)(b). But the legislature did not use the words "at-fault
defendants," nor did it specifically include only negligent tortfeasors or
exclude intentional tortfeasors. Rather, the legislature qualified damage
recovery only on the fault-free status of the plaintiff. As the dissent suc-
cinctly states, "Defendants include both negligent and intentional defen-
dants and total damages include those damages caused by defendants
who are both intentional and negligent actors. The status quo for fault-
free claimants was maintained. 20 9
The majority ultimately held that damages resulting from inten-
tional acts must be segregated from damages resulting from fault as de-
fined by section 015,210 before joint and several liability is applied to at-
fault defendants under section 070(l)(b). 21 ' This analysis is clearly im-
proper, even in cases in which multiple defendants are all negligent.212 In
those cases, the analysis begins with a determination of whether the
plaintiff is at fault. The majority did not begin its analysis this way, how-
ever, which is a crucial oversight because this determination removes the
case from the purview of section 070(1) and place it squarely within the
exception under section 070(l)(b). Once the court determines that the
plaintiff is fault free, all named defendants will be held jointly and sever-
ally liable for the sum of their proportionate shares. But if judgment has
not been entered against a defendant, that defendant's share of fault will
not be imposed on defendants who are jointly and severally liable and
will not be collectable by the plaintiff. Recognizing this fact, the dissent
states that "[t]he majority reads too much into the first sentence of RCW
208. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
209. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 131, 75 P.3d at 511 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
210. "'Fault' includes acts of omissions ... that are in any measure negligent or reckless to-
ward the person or property of the actor or others .. " WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1981).
211. Id. at 115, 75 P.3d at 503.
212. Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 294, 840 P.2d 860, 886 (1992) (tortfea-
sors may be held jointly and severally liable for accident victim's damages where victim is free from
fault). See supra note 144 and accompanying text; Koste v. Chambers, 78 Wash. App. 691, 695, 899
P.2d 814, 816 (1995) (under exception to general rule of several liability, joint and several liability
arises if (1) trier of fact concludes that claimant or party suffering bodily injury is fault free, and (2)
judgment is entered against two or more defendants; as to latter element, defendant against whom
judgment is entered must be named defendant in case when court enters its final judgment).
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[§] 4.22.070 which speaks to 'all actions involving fault.' This language
is in the context of the general rule. The section before us is in the con-
text of the exception. 2t 3
Strikingly, Tegman is difficult to reconcile with two prior case
precedents. First, the majority's segregation rule misreads Welch.2 4 The
Welch court held that in light of the statutory definition of "fault," a neg-
ligent or reckless defendant could not apportion liability to a third party
intentional tortfeasor under section 070.2 '5 This somewhat interpretive
conclusion was compelled by the language of the statute.
The comparison the majority makes to Welch is defective for two
reasons. First, Welch is distinguishable both factually and procedurally
because the plaintiff was also held liable and the unknown assailant was
not named in the suit.2 16 Thus, Welch was not decided under the section
070(1)(b) exception; rather, it was decided under section 070(1), in
which case several liability is the general rule and intentional acts or
omissions are not part of the definition or analysis of fault.21 7 Second, as
hard as the majority tries to harmonize its ruling with Welch, "segrega-
tion" is just another fancy word for "apportion." As the majority sug-
gests, the trier of fact initially "segregates" damages between "at-fault"
defendants and non-fault defendants; damages are then "apportioned" to
the "at-fault" defendants who may be held jointly and severally liable
amongst themselves. 21 8 The negligent tortfeasors are in fact receiving the
benefit of "allocating" a share of the damages to the intentional tortfea-
sors. No matter which word or phrase is selected, the majority's decision
is not in accord with Welch.
Second, Tegman may or may not be reconcilable with Cox or
Phennah depending on whether Tegman is interpreted as a divisible inju-
ries case or an indivisible injury case. Both Cox and Phennah stood for
the proposition that when a plaintiff is fault free and the defendants do
not meet their burden of segregating the plaintiffs harm, each defendant
is liable for all of the plaintiffs indivisible damages.21 9 If Tegman is seen
as an indivisible injury case, then the Court of Appeals decided the case
213. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 132, 75 P.3d at 511 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 115-16, 75 P.3d at 503.
215. Welch v. Southland Corp., 134 Wash. 2d 629, 636-37, 952 P.2d 162, 166 (1998).
216. Id. at 631, 952 P.2d at 164 ("[W]here the plaintiff, a negligent tortfeasor defendant, and an
intentional tortfeasor are all liable, the negligent defendant is entitled to the benefit of the compara-
tive fault statute." (citing Clerk's Papers (CP) at 54)).
217. Id. at 635-36, 952 P.2d at 166.
218. See Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 115-16, 75 P.3d at 503.
219. Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wash. 2d 431, 447, 5 P.3d 1265, 1273 (2000); Phennah v. Whalen,
28 Wash. App. 19, 26-28, 621 P.2d 1304, 1309-10 (1980). See discussion supra Part I.C.
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properly, 220 and its decision accords with Cox and Phennah. In that case,
the court would be incapable of segregating the indivisible injury by
definition. However, if Tegman is seen as a divisible injuries case, then
the Cox and Phennah burden-shifting scheme would not apply. Interest-
ingly, even if Tegman stands, it has not overturned either Cox or Phen-
nab; it has, however, undercut them by effectively shifting the burden of
segregating harm from the defendants who caused the harm to the trier of
fact, who is now obligated to segregate indivisible damages in the ab-
sence of any factual basis for so doing.22'
The Washington Supreme Court in Tegman effectively abolished
the joint and several liability of negligent and intentional wrongdoers.
Ironically, in the same year as Tegman was decided, the legislature con-
sidered and rejected legislation that would have accomplished the same
end. That year, the legislature considered the Omnibus Tort Bill that
would have amended section 015 to include intentional acts within the
definition of "fault." 222 The legislative intent of this amendment was to
eliminate joint and several liability by allowing negligent defendants to
apportion fault against intentional wrongdoers under section 070.223 The
Senate passed the Omnibus Tort Bill, but the House of Representatives
rejected it-the death of joint and several liability between intentional
and negligent tortfeasors did not come to pass. 224 The proposed amend-
ment shows that the Washington Legislature recognized that intentional
and negligent tortfeasors continued to be jointly and severally liable after
the Tort Reform Act of 1986. If intentional and negligent tortfeasors did
not continue to be jointly and severally liable, policymakers would not
have tried to change the law to eliminate joint and several liability.225
B. How Other Jurisdictions "Integrated"
When Washington "Segregated"
"Whether segregation is required in other states is irrelevant unless
they have statutes like ours .... Lack of precedent is hardly a bar to car-
rying out the legislature's statutory directives., 226 But, the majority failed
to see that there is also a lack of precedent for its "segregation" ruling in
220. Tegman, 107 Wash. App. 868, 885, 30 P.3d 8, 18 (2001) ("Noble has not pointed out any
basis upon which the trial court, as finder of fact, could have segregated the damages with greater
precision.").
221. Budlong, supra note 5 (discussing the conflict between Tegman and Cox).
222. S. 5728, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Budlong, supra note 5.
226. Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 102, 117-18, 75 P.3d 497,
504 (2003).
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Tegman. Although other jurisdictions' comparative fault statutes may not
be identical to Washington's, the underlying principles are the same, and
any solutions implemented by other states may have been instructive to
the court in making its decision.
Generally, comparative fault principles are not applicable to inten-
tional torts. The familiar general rule is that there is no apportionment of
damages where an intentional tort was involved. But, other jurisdictions
have made exceptions to the general rule in certain circumstances. Spe-
cifically, exceptions have been granted in cases (1) where there is a fidu-
ciary or other special relationship giving rise to a duty to prevent inten-
tional harm by third parties,227 and (2) where the concept has been
adopted that intentional wrongdoing is "different in degree" from negli-
gent conduct.228
Significantly, just ten years prior to Tegman, a United States Dis-
trict Court interpreted section 070(1)(b) in In the Matter of Colorado
Springs Air Crash.229 The case stemmed from a fatal airplane crash and
involved a choice of law question between three states in the settlement
negotiations with decedents' families. 230 The court found that, although
generally defendants are only severally liable for their joint torts in
Washington, an exception exists when the plaintiff is in no way respon-
sible for his own injuries. 23' The court applied this exception to the facts
in the case, stating, "While the statute actually requires a determination
by a trier of fact that the plaintiff was in no way responsible for his own
injuries, we find it inconceivable, and Boeing has not argued, that the
decedents were in anyway contributorily negligent. The plaintiffs here
therefore satisfy RCWA § 4.22.070(1)(b). '232 The court's plain language
interpretation of section 070(1)(b) is undoubtedly transparent.
In Blazovic v. Andrich,233 the New Jersey Supreme Court unani-
mously held that "responsibility for a plaintiffs claimed injury is to be
apportioned according to each party's relative degree of fault, including
227. See id. at 127, 75 P.3d at 509; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965);
Allan L. Schwartz, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Principles to Intentional Torts, 18
A.L.R.5th 525 (1994); Sisk, supra note 86, at 31-38.
228. Tegman, 150 Wash. 2d at 129, 75 P.3d at 509-10. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 462 (5th ed. 1984)); Schwartz, supra note
227.
229. 867 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
230. Id. at 632-34 (Colorado, where the crash occurred and most of the decedents resided;
Illinois, where the airline had its principal place of business and the flight originated; and Washing-
ton, where the airplane was manufactured).
231. Id. at 633 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1993); Washburn v. Beatt Equip.
Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 294, 840 P.2d 860, 886 (1992)).
232. Id. at 633 n.2.
233. 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991).
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the fault attributable to an intentional tortfeasor., 234 Plaintiff Blazovic
filed suit against a restaurant and its owner claiming that they negligently
failed to provide adequate lighting and security for patrons in the restau-
rant's parking lot, and had failed to exercise reasonable care in providing
alcoholic beverages to the defendants.235 Blazovic also filed suit against
several patrons of the restaurant-Andrich, Philbin, Angelo, LaBanca,
and Zecchino-for negligently or intentionally striking him as he left the
restaurant, causing him to sustain physical injuries and economic 1OSS.236
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the "difference in kind"
theory between intentional conduct on the one hand, and negligent con-
duct on the other, concluding instead that such conduct is "different in
degree.,237 Thus, the different levels of culpability inherent in each type
of conduct would be reflected in the jury's apportionment of fault. 238 By
analyzing types of tortious conduct in this way, the court closely adhered
to the guiding principle of comparative fault-to distribute the liability in
proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that lOSS. 239 The
court concluded that a "complete verdict" should apportion each party's
relative responsibility for the compensatory damages, including the rela-
tive fault of the intentional tortfeasors 4°
In Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation
Services., Inc.,241 the Kansas Supreme Court held that negligent tortfea-
sors should not be allowed to reduce their fault by the intentional fault of
242another which they had a duty to prevent. Here, the plaintiff filed suit
against a school bus driver for intentional battery, and against the school
district and the school bus transportation service on theories of respon-
deat superior and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of the
234. Id. at 231; see also Steele v. Kerrigan, 689 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1997) (comparative fault ap-
plied to assault by underage patron and tavern's negligent supervision of the premises under dram
shop statute); accord Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000) (comparative fault statute
applies when one of several tortfeasors commits intentional tort that contributes to indivisible in-
jury); Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 453 (Ariz. 1998) (jury may apportion fault
among defendants and nonparties without distinguishing between intentional and negligent conduct
or requiring that a minimum percentage of responsibility be assigned to intentional tortfeasor);
Bhinder v. Sun Co., Inc., 717 A.2d 202 (Conn. 1998) (even where statute did not permit apportion-
ment between negligent and intentional tortfeasors, apportionment would be allowed as a matter of
common law).
235. Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 224.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 231.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 232.
241. 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991).
242. Id. at 606.
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school bus driver.243 The trial court apportioned fault between the school
district and the school bus transportation service, but held them jointly
and severally liable with the school bus driver.244 The school district and
the school bus transportation service appealed to the Kansas Supreme
Court, asking the court to adopt the "hybrid" approach proposed by Pro-
fessor Westerbeke.245 In his law review article, Professor Westerbeke
recommended "a hybrid approach in which the intentional tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for the total amount of damages, but the neg-
ligent tortfeasor is liable only for that portion of the total damages repre-
senting his proportionate fault., 246 The court noted that it would be con-
tradictory to hold a negligent tortfeasor jointly and severally liable when
his actions combine with those of an intentional tortfeasor, while in other
contexts negligent tortfeasors are held liable only for a proportionate
fault share of the damages. 47 In the end, although it considered the "hy-
brid approach," the court "elect[ed] to follow the precedential path' 248
marked by earlier decisions that had declined to compare negligent con-
duct with intentional conduct.249
Other jurisdictions have also created exceptions to the general rule
of comparative fault when an intentional tortfeasor is involved. In
Michigan, for example, joint and several liability was eliminated except
250for cases involving a fault-free plaintiff and products liability cases.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a state law251 is broad enough
to allow comparison between intentional tortfeasors and negligent tort-
feasors, but the determination of whether such a comparison should be
made must be determined by the trial court on a case-by-case basis,
based on applicable public policy concerns.252 Under Tennessee law,"conduct of [a] negligent defendant should not be compared with the in-
tentional conduct of another in determining comparative fault where the
intentional conduct is the foreseeable risk created by the negligent tort-
243. Id. at 591.
244, Id. at 592.
245. Id. at 605-06.
246 Id. at 606 (quoting William Edward Westerbeke, Survey of Kansas Law: Torts, 33 KAN.
L. REv. 1, 33 (1984)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Sisk, supra note 86, at 29-30 (stating that "[t]he Kansas State Bank decision is disap-
pointing. The court offered no analysis or reasoning for its result other than to observe that no other
court had adopted the hybrid approach... The Kansas court abdicated its responsibility to provide a
reasoned response to what it confessed was a 'contradiction' in the law.").
250. Peck, supra note 21, at 240 (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 6304 (1970), amended by
1986 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 178 (West)).
251. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (1979).
252. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 718 (La. 1994).
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feasor ... under this rule, [a] negligent defendant may be found 100% at
fault for the injuries sustained by [the] victim as a result of another's in-
tentional act., 253
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has noticed this "contradiction"
or "anomaly" of trying to place an intentional tortfeasor within a com-
parative fault regime. Under section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, which governs apportionment of liability, a person who is liable to
another based on a failure to protect the other from the specific risk of an
intentional tort is jointly and severally liable for the share of comparative
fault assigned to the intentional tortfeasor in addition to the person's
share of comparative responsibility. 254 This approach is based in part on
the fact that when a person is injured by an intentional tort and another
person negligently failed to protect against the risk of an intentional tort,
the great culpability of the intentional tortfeasor may lead a finder of fact
to assign the bulk of responsibility to the intentional tortfeasor, who will
often be insolvent. 255
In sum, the majority in Tegman failed to consider the possibility
that intentional and negligent tortfeasors could be held jointly and sever-
ally liable within a comparative fault scheme. The majority was adamant
that unless other jurisdictions had statutes with language identical to
Washington's, solutions offered by other jurisdictions would not be con-
sidered. Notwithstanding its strict language requirements for comparison
with out-of-jurisdiction statutes, the majority was at the same time ignor-
ing the plain language of the statutory exception-joint and several li-
ability survives when a plaintiff is fault free. The majority's segregation
rule is hard to accept given that the Colorado Springs Air Crash court
interpreted the identical statute in exactly the same way as did the dissent
in Tegman. Most troubling is that the majority could have adopted any
one of a number of solutions offered by other jurisdictions. Any one of
these would have reconciled the equities of the situation in favor of the
plaintiff with the doctrine of joint and several liability within a modified
comparative fault scheme. For example, the court could have adopted the
"difference in degree" analysis of Blazovic, or made joint and several
liability applicable only to the intentional tortfeasor as in Kansas State
Bank. Alternatively, the court could have conducted its analysis on a
case-by-case basis as in Louisiana. Instead, the majority dismissed the
253. DePalma v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson County, Tenn., 40 Fed. App'x 187 (6th
Cir. 2002).
254. See Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 2001); J.D. LEE,
BARRY LINDAHL, 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 12:18.50 APPLICATION OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE--COMMON-LAW RULES-INTENTIONAL TORTS (2d ed. 2005), available at
Westlaw, MTLLL § 12:18.50.
255. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14, cmt. b (2000).
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doctrine of joint and several liability, re-modified modified comparative
fault, and reinterpreted the express language of section 070(1)(b). In so
doing, the court disregarded public policy and ignored the simple and
most important fact-that the plaintiff was in no way to blame for any of
the injuries that she sustained.
C. The Aftermath: How to Limit Further Damage
to Plaintiffs in the Post-Tegman World
Negligent defendants can be expected to use the Tegman segrega-
tion rule to reduce or defeat claims by innocent persons who have a legal
right to protection from crime or fraud. Although some of the proposed
solutions work around the Tegman rule, the correct solution would re-
quire the Washington Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in Teg-
man.
The easiest, and perhaps most apparent, solution would be for the
legislature to include intentional torts in a comparative fault scheme. The
legislature would have to take two steps in order to accomplish this goal.
First, it would have to revise the definition of fault under section 015 to
include intentional acts and omissions, thereby negating the "anomaly"
and disposing of the Tegman situation. This solution alone, however, is
not sufficient. Second, the legislature should insert a mechanism by
which to deter intentional acts. Although punitive damages are generally
not recoverable in Washington2 56 because they are deemed "contrary to
public policy, '257 the legislature could include a section within the Tort
Reform Act to enable the recovery of punitive damages against inten-
tional tortfeasors.258 This "integrate-then-punish" proposal is logistically
and administratively more appealing than the "segregate-then-apportion"
rule set out by Tegman.
An alternative solution would be for the courts to adopt a common-
sense or no-nonsense approach of limiting the liability of minor actors.
Defense practitioners' main concerns with joint and several liability are
256. Grays Harbor County v. Bay City Lumber Co., 47 Wash. 2d 879, 883, 289 P.2d 975
(1955) (exemplary or punitive damages are generally not recoverable in the State of Washington
unless expressly authorized by statute).
257. Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 572, 574, 919 P.2d 589 (1996).
258. Sisk, supra note 86, at 25-26 states the following:
Both the New Jersey court in Blazovic and the commentators advocating extension of
comparative fault to intentional torts have justified their new approach in part by observ-
ing that the policy goal of punishing wanton acts can better be achieved through assess-
ment of punitive damages against intentional tortfeasors. Punitive damages, however, are
not available in Washington. Thus, for cases involving deliberate tortious injury, strict in-
sistence that intentional tortfeasors be held fully responsible for damages remains the best
and perhaps only means (other than criminal prosecution) for punishment in Washington.
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equity and fairness-that is, a defendant who is one percent at fault
should not be held jointly and severally liable with an insolvent defen-
dant who is ninety-nine percent at fault simply because he has the "deep
pocket." If the legislature will not take action, then the judiciary must
address this problem by limiting the liability of remote and often minor
actors, at least when the other defendant has directly engaged in particu-
larly egregious conduct. For example, in Klein v. City of Seattle,25 9 the
court refused to hold the City liable for negligent road design, reasoning
that the speeding driver that crossed the center line and collided with
plaintiffs car was the proximate legal cause of the accident, not the de-
fective road design. Similarly, in Braegelmann v. Snohomish County,26 0
the court did not hold the county liable for decedent's death by reason of
negligent road construction and design, but rather the defendant driver
whose extreme conduct included speeding, crossing the center line, and
driving while highly intoxicated. 261 Essentially, the courts should closely
scrutinize the actions of multiple defendants and determine how far the
consequences of a defendant's acts should extend.
In the end, if neither the legislature nor the courts take action, it will
be up to the individual plaintiffs and their attorneys to make bold and
strategic decisions. One possibility is to revise the complaint strategy and
gamble by claiming negligence against all defendants instead of alleging
intentional conduct against one or more. The dissent in Tegman foresaw
this, suggesting that "[a] savvy claimant will allege only fault based
claims to preserve joint and several liability under the majority's reading
of RCW [§] 4.22.070(1).262
Plaintiffs' attorneys could also strategically decide to join the inten-
tional tortfeasor as a defendant in the lawsuit. Prior to Tegman, the plain-
tiffs decision whether to sue the intentional tortfeasor was based on trial
strategy, because the intentional and negligent tortfeasor would be jointly
and severally liable under title 4, chapter 22, section 030 of the Revised
Code of Washington. Tegman, however, changed the landscape by hold-
ing that even when a plaintiff is fault free, a negligent tortfeasor is sever-
ally liability under section 070, and only jointly and severally liable for
damages caused by defendants against whom judgment is entered. 63
259. 41 Wash. App. 636, 639, 705 P.2d 806, 808 (1985).
260. 53 Wash. App. 381, 385-86, 766 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1989).
261. But see Stephens v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. App. 140, 144, 813 P.2d 608, 610 (1991)
(fact that motorcyclist may have been drinking and was speeding when he hit curb did not justify
holding, as a matter of law, that the sole proximate cause of accident was motorcyclist's own negli-
gence, rather than city's design of intersection).
262. Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 102, 134, 75 P.3d 497,
512 (2003) (Chambers, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 105, 75 P.3d at 497. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1993).
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Thus, if the intentional tortfeasor is not joined as a defendant in the law-
suit, no judgment can be entered against him. And if he is not joined, the
negligent tortfeasors may be able to reduce their liability by apportioning
fault against the absent intentional tortfeasor and treating him as an
"empty chair" defendant.264
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of joint and several liability serves a purpose in Wash-
ington's comparative fault scheme. The existence of these two doctrines
within tort law is not inherently contradictory, and is, in fact, comple-
mentary in certain situations. The classic scenario involves a plaintiff
who lacks any fault whatsoever and who has suffered damages that are
due entirely to the fault of any combination of multiple defendants. The
case for preserving joint and several liability in this situation is more
compelling in Washington because it is an explicitly carved-out excep-
tion to the general rule of several or proportionate liability codified in
title 4, chapter 22, section 070(1)(b) of the Revised Code of Washington.
The Washington State Supreme Court should grant reconsideration
and overrule its decision in Tegman. The results-oriented rule, which
requires that damages be segregated between negligent and intentional
defendants, with negligent defendants only being jointly and severally
liable with each other, demonstrates the mental gymnastics with respect
to the court's reasoning and the rule's application. First, the court's rule
irresponsibly ignores the significant fact that the plaintiff is fault free and
that an explicit statutory exception applies when the plaintiff is fault free.
Second, the court ignores plain and unambiguous statutory language,
adopting instead an expansive and unsupported interpretation of the leg-
islature's intent within the Act's Preamble. Third, without overruling
either Phennah or Cox, the court has placed the burden of proof back
onto the plaintiff to segregate the damages and, effectively, to prove two
separate cases, one against negligent defendants and another against in-
tentional defendants. Fault-free plaintiffs have been left with an even
heavier burden under Tegman, and have been left to develop creative and
complicated solutions to the Tegman problem.
In the alternative, should the court decide not to reconsider its hold-
ing, the legislature must make its intent clear for the court so that the
statutory exception will be interpreted accurately in subsequent cases.
The legislature should be alarmed that both its intent and the plain lan-
264. Joining intentional defendants may have other unintended psychological advantages. See
Darrell Cochran, Intentional Tortfeasors: Bad People, Good Defendants, WSTLA Trial News, Dec.
1,2001, at 37-44.
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guage of the statute have been simultaneously misinterpreted. The legis-
lature can, and most probably has, achieved its goal of mitigating the
liability of government and businesses by mandating the applicability of
proportionate liability; however, to allow proportionate liability in a
situation where a fault-free plaintiff has been damaged by multiple de-
fendants, regardless of their classification, amounts to nothing more than
an affirmation of the court's results-oriented reasoning. In the end, de-
fendants have found new allies in the legislature and judiciary, and plain-
tiffs have been left to their own devices. It amounts to nothing more than
a modem day telling of the classic story of David and Goliath.
